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Municipal bonds and fiscal architecture of urban local bodies

16 Oct 2025 GS 3 Economy
Municipal bonds and fiscal architecture of urban local bodies Click to view full image

1. Context and Background

  • Urban India contributes nearly two-thirds of national GDP, yet municipalities control less than 1% of the country’s tax revenue.

  • This mismatch between economic output and fiscal empowerment reflects a structural flaw in India’s municipal finance system.

  • Municipalities depend excessively on intergovernmental transfers, loans, and centrally-sponsored schemes, limiting their autonomy.

2. Why the Fiscal Architecture is Flawed

(a) Over-centralisation of Taxation Powers

  • After the introduction of Goods and Services Tax (GST) in 2017, cities lost nearly 19% of their own revenue sources.

  • Key local taxes such as octroi, entry tax, and surcharges were subsumed under GST.

  • Compensatory mechanisms for municipalities were promised but not effectively delivered.

  • Result: Municipalities became fiscally dependent on higher governments, undermining local democracy.

(b) Fiscal Asymmetry and Inversion of Responsibility

  • Municipalities are responsible for essential services — waste management, housing, climate resilience, digital infrastructure — but lack the fiscal means to deliver them.

  • This results in a “centralised power, decentralised responsibility” model — contrary to the spirit of the 74th Constitutional Amendment (1992), which envisioned municipalities as autonomous tiers of governance.

3. The Issue with Municipal Bonds

(a) Policy Push

  • Municipal bonds are being promoted by NITI Aayog and other policy bodies as the “new frontier of local finance.”

  • However, the credibility and uptake of municipal bonds in India remain abysmally low.

(b) Flawed Credibility Assessment

  • City creditworthiness is assessed only by “own revenue” performance — property taxes, user charges, etc.

  • Regular grants and transfers from State/Centre are discounted as “non-recurring income”, which is a conceptual and ideological error.

  • These transfers are constitutional entitlements, not charity.

(c) Inadequate Property Tax Dependence

  • Property tax contributes only 20–25% of municipal revenues and faces political resistance, poor assessment systems, and inefficient collection.

  • Excessive emphasis on property tax reform shifts the burden to residents, particularly low-income groups, violating principles of fiscal equity.

(d) “User Pays” Fallacy

  • The growing idea that “user pays” leads to efficiency is problematic.

  • Public goods like water, sanitation, mobility, and lighting are collective entitlements, not private commodities.

  • This trend converts public services into market products, undermining inclusion.

4. The Constitutional and Federal Perspective

  • The 74th Amendment intended to make cities equal tiers of governance, with access to a share of the national tax pool.

  • However, fiscal federalism remains highly asymmetric, with limited functional and financial devolution to local governments.

  • Grants are often scheme-based, tied, and conditional, restricting local innovation and responsiveness.

5. Lessons from Global Models

(a) Scandinavian Model (Denmark, Sweden, Norway)

  • Municipalities enjoy direct power to levy and collect income taxes.

  • Local taxes are the foundation of the welfare state.

  • Ensures transparency, accountability, and long-term planning at the local level.

  • Transfers from higher levels of government are viewed as part of a shared fiscal ecosystem, not as discretionary favours.

This model demonstrates that fiscal decentralisation can promote both efficiency and equity.

6. The Way Forward

(a) Reimagining Fiscal Federalism

  • Establish predictable, adequate, and untied revenues for municipalities.

  • Strengthen constitutional and formula-based transfers rather than discretionary grants.

(b) Reform Creditworthiness Framework

  • Recognise grants and shared taxes as legitimate city income in credit ratings.

  • Evaluate governance quality (audit compliance, transparency, citizen participation) — not just financial metrics.

(c) Municipal Bond Reform

  • Allow cities to use GST compensation or State share as collateral for bonds.

  • Develop risk-pooling mechanisms and State-level municipal development funds to improve creditworthiness.

(d) Strengthening Local Capacity

  • Build technical and administrative capacity for budgeting, financial management, and project execution.

  • Encourage citizen oversight and participatory budgeting to enhance accountability.

First Municipal Bond (1997):

  • Issuer: Bangalore Municipal Corporation.

  • Purpose: Infrastructure development.

Largest Issue (2018):

  • Issuer: Amaravati Capital Region Development Authority (CRDA).

  • Value: ₹2,000 crore.

  • Objective: Development of the new Andhra Pradesh capital region.

Municipal Bonds Key Features

  • Government-backed security: Lower default risk due to municipal ownership.

  • Tax benefits: Interest earned is often exempt from income tax, attracting retail and institutional investors.

  • Credit ratings:

    • Bonds are rated by agencies such as CRISIL, ICRA, and CARE.

    • Ratings improve transparency and investor confidence.

  • Tradability: Some municipal bonds are listed on stock exchanges, improving liquidity.

Recent Trends (FY18–FY26)

  • Between FY18 and Q2 FY26, 17 urban local bodies issued 23 municipal bonds, raising a total of ₹3,359 crore.

  • In the first half of FY26 (April–September 2025) alone, six municipalities have raised ₹575 crore.

  • An additional 7–10 ULBs are in the pipeline for bond issuance, indicating growing participation.

  • Projected FY26 total issuance: Around ₹2,000 crore, which is expected to be the highest annual issuance to date in India’s municipal bond market.

Challenges

  • Despite progress, the overall market size remains modest compared to international standards (e.g., U.S. municipal bond market > $4 trillion).

  • Limited investor base and low credit ratings of most ULBs.

  • Weak municipal accounting systems and delays in project execution.

  • Need for stronger revenue models (property tax, user charges, etc.) to assure timely repayment.



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